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This replaces `ver_rct_non_semantics_simple_cached()` with an API that offloads the responsibility of tracking input verification successes to the caller. The main caller of this function in the codebase, `cryptonote::Blockchain()` instead keeps track of the verification results for transaction in the mempool by storing a "verification ID" in the mempool metadata table (with `txpool_tx_meta_t`). This has several benefits, including: * When the mempool is large (>8192 txs), we no longer experience cache misses and unnecessarily re-verify ring signatures. This greatly improves block propagation time for FCMP++ blocks under load * For the same reason, reorg handling can be sped up by storing verification IDs of transactions popped from the chain * Speeds up re-validating every mempool transaction on fork change (monerod revalidates the whole tx-pool on HFs #10142) * Caches results for every single type of Monero transaction, not just latest RCT type * Cache persists over a node restart * Uses 512KiB less RAM (8192*2*32B) * No additional storage or DB migration required since `txpool_tx_meta_t` already had padding allocated * Moves more verification logic out of `cryptonote::Blockchain` Furthermore, this opens the door to future multi-threaded block verification speed-ups. Right now, transactions' input proof verification is limited to one transaction at a time. However, one can imagine a scenario with verification IDs where input proofs are optimistically multi-threaded in advance of block processing. Then, even though ring member fetching and verification is single-threaded inside of `cryptonote::Blockchain::check_tx_inputs()`, the single thread can skip the CPU-intensive cryptographic code if the verification ID allows it. Also changes the default log category in `tx_verification_utils.cpp` from "blockchain" to "verify".
270 lines
13 KiB
C++
270 lines
13 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2025, The Monero Project
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//
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// All rights reserved.
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//
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// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
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// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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//
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// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
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// conditions and the following disclaimer.
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//
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// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
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// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
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// materials provided with the distribution.
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//
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// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
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// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
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// prior written permission.
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//
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// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
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// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
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// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
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// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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#include "gtest/gtest.h"
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#include "cryptonote_core/cryptonote_tx_utils.h"
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#include "cryptonote_core/tx_verification_utils.h"
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TEST(tx_verification_utils, make_input_verification_id)
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{
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rct::key key1, key2, key3;
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epee::from_hex::to_buffer(epee::as_mut_byte_span(key1), "e50f476129d40af31e0938743f7f2d60e867aab31294f7acaf6e38f0976f0228");
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epee::from_hex::to_buffer(epee::as_mut_byte_span(key2), "e50f476129d40af31e0938743f7f2d60e867aab31294f7acaf6e38f0976f0227");
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epee::from_hex::to_buffer(epee::as_mut_byte_span(key3), "d50f476129d40af31e0938743f7f2d60e867aab31294f7acaf6e38f0976f0228");
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const crypto::hash hash1 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {});
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const crypto::hash hash2 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key2), {});
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const crypto::hash hash3 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key3), {});
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ASSERT_NE(hash1, hash2);
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ASSERT_NE(hash1, hash3);
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ASSERT_NE(hash2, hash3);
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const crypto::hash hash4 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key1}}});
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const crypto::hash hash5 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key2}}});
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const crypto::hash hash6 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key3}}});
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ASSERT_NE(hash4, hash5);
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ASSERT_NE(hash4, hash6);
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ASSERT_NE(hash5, hash6);
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const crypto::hash hash7 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key1},{key1, key1}}});
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const crypto::hash hash8 = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key1}},{{key1, key1}}});
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ASSERT_NE(hash7, hash8);
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const crypto::hash hash1_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {});
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const crypto::hash hash2_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key2), {});
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const crypto::hash hash3_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key3), {});
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const crypto::hash hash4_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key1}}});
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const crypto::hash hash5_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key2}}});
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const crypto::hash hash6_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key3}}});
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const crypto::hash hash7_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key1},{key1, key1}}});
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const crypto::hash hash8_eq = cryptonote::make_input_verification_id(rct::rct2hash(key1), {{{key1, key1}},{{key1, key1}}});
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ASSERT_EQ(hash1, hash1_eq);
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ASSERT_EQ(hash2, hash2_eq);
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ASSERT_EQ(hash3, hash3_eq);
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ASSERT_EQ(hash4, hash4_eq);
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ASSERT_EQ(hash5, hash5_eq);
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ASSERT_EQ(hash6, hash6_eq);
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ASSERT_EQ(hash7, hash7_eq);
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ASSERT_EQ(hash8, hash8_eq);
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}
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TEST(tx_verification_utils, ver_input_proofs_rings)
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{
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// constants
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static constexpr size_t N_INPUTS = 2;
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static constexpr size_t N_OUTPUTS = 10;
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static constexpr size_t N_RING_MEMBERS = 16;
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static constexpr bool USE_VIEW_TAGS = true;
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static constexpr rct::RCTConfig RCT_CONFIG{ rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, 4 }; // CLSAG, BP+
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static constexpr uint8_t HF_VERSION = HF_VERSION_VIEW_TAGS + 1; // CLSAG, BP+, after grace period
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// generate accounts
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hw::device &hwdev = hw::get_device("default");
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cryptonote::account_base alice;
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alice.generate();
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const cryptonote::account_public_address &alice_main_addr = alice.get_keys().m_account_address;
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const std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, cryptonote::subaddress_index> alice_subaddresses{
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{alice_main_addr.m_spend_public_key, {}}
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};
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cryptonote::account_base bob;
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bob.generate();
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const cryptonote::account_public_address &bob_main_addr = bob.get_keys().m_account_address;
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cryptonote::account_base aether;
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aether.generate();
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// populate inputs
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rct::xmr_amount total_input_amounts = 0;
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std::vector<cryptonote::tx_source_entry> sources;
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sources.reserve(N_INPUTS);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < N_INPUTS; ++i)
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{
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const rct::xmr_amount in_amount = crypto::rand_range<rct::xmr_amount>(0, COIN) + COIN; // [1, 2] XMR
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const size_t real_in_ring_idx = crypto::rand_idx(N_RING_MEMBERS);
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// generate one-time address from derivation
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crypto::secret_key in_main_tx_privkey;
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crypto::public_key in_main_tx_pubkey;
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crypto::generate_keys(in_main_tx_pubkey, in_main_tx_privkey); // (r, R)
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crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(in_main_tx_privkey, in_main_tx_pubkey);
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crypto::key_derivation ecdh;
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ASSERT_TRUE(hwdev.generate_key_derivation(in_main_tx_pubkey, alice.get_keys().m_view_secret_key, ecdh));
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const size_t real_output_in_tx_index = crypto::rand_idx(N_OUTPUTS);
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crypto::public_key in_onetime_address;
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crypto::view_tag in_view_tag;
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std::vector<crypto::public_key> in_additional_tx_public_keys;
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std::vector<rct::key> in_amount_keys;
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ASSERT_TRUE(hwdev.generate_output_ephemeral_keys(/*tx_version=*/2,
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aether.get_keys(), in_main_tx_pubkey, in_main_tx_privkey,
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{0, alice_main_addr, false}, /*change_addr=*/boost::none, real_output_in_tx_index,
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/*need_additional_txkeys=*/false, /*additional_tx_keys=*/{},
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in_additional_tx_public_keys,
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in_amount_keys, in_onetime_address,
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USE_VIEW_TAGS, in_view_tag));
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ASSERT_EQ(1, in_amount_keys.size());
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const rct::key in_amount_blinding_factor = rct::genCommitmentMask(in_amount_keys.at(0));
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const rct::key in_amount_commitment = rct::commit(in_amount, in_amount_blinding_factor);
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// randomly populate decoys and insert real spend
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auto &tx_source = sources.emplace_back();
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tx_source.outputs.reserve(N_RING_MEMBERS);
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for (size_t j = 0; j < N_RING_MEMBERS; ++j)
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{
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const size_t ring_member_global_output_idx = 20 * j;
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if (j == real_in_ring_idx)
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{
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tx_source.outputs.emplace_back(ring_member_global_output_idx,
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rct::ctkey{rct::pk2rct(in_onetime_address), in_amount_commitment});
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}
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else // decoy
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{
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tx_source.outputs.emplace_back(ring_member_global_output_idx,
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rct::ctkey{rct::pkGen(), rct::pkGen()});
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}
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}
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tx_source.real_output = real_in_ring_idx;
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tx_source.real_out_tx_key = in_main_tx_pubkey;
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tx_source.real_out_additional_tx_keys = in_additional_tx_public_keys;
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tx_source.real_output_in_tx_index = real_output_in_tx_index;
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tx_source.amount = in_amount;
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tx_source.rct = true;
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tx_source.mask = in_amount_blinding_factor;
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tx_source.multisig_kLRki = {};
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total_input_amounts += in_amount;
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}
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// populate destinations
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const rct::xmr_amount approx_fee = 500000000000; // 0.5 XMR
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const rct::xmr_amount dest_amount = (total_input_amounts - approx_fee) / N_OUTPUTS;
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std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> destinations;
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destinations.reserve(N_OUTPUTS);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < N_OUTPUTS - 1; ++i)
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destinations.push_back(cryptonote::tx_destination_entry(dest_amount, bob_main_addr, false));
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destinations.push_back(cryptonote::tx_destination_entry(dest_amount, alice_main_addr, false));
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// construct transaction
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cryptonote::transaction tx;
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crypto::secret_key main_tx_key;
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std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
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ASSERT_TRUE(cryptonote::construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(alice.get_keys(),
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alice_subaddresses,
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sources,
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destinations,
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alice_main_addr,
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/*extra=*/{},
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tx,
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main_tx_key,
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additional_tx_keys,
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/*rct=*/true,
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RCT_CONFIG,
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USE_VIEW_TAGS));
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ASSERT_EQ(N_INPUTS, tx.vin.size());
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ASSERT_EQ(N_OUTPUTS, tx.vout.size());
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ASSERT_EQ(N_RING_MEMBERS, boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(tx.vin.at(0)).key_offsets.size());
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ASSERT_GE(tx.rct_signatures.txnFee, approx_fee);
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ASSERT_LE(tx.rct_signatures.txnFee, approx_fee + N_OUTPUTS);
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// collect mix rings
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rct::ctkeyM mixrings(N_INPUTS);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < N_INPUTS; ++i)
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{
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mixrings.at(i).resize(N_RING_MEMBERS);
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for (size_t j = 0; j < N_RING_MEMBERS; ++j)
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{
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mixrings.at(i).at(j) = sources.at(i).outputs.at(j).second;
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}
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}
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// serialize transaction to blob
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const cryptonote::blobdata tx_blob = cryptonote::tx_to_blob(tx);
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// de-serialize transaction from blob
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cryptonote::transaction deserialized_tx;
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ASSERT_TRUE(cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(tx_blob, deserialized_tx));
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// test non-input consensus rules
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cryptonote::tx_verification_context tvc{};
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ASSERT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_non_input_consensus(deserialized_tx, tvc, HF_VERSION));
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ASSERT_FALSE(tvc.m_verifivation_failed);
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// test verify input rings [positive]
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EXPECT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, mixrings));
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// test verify input rings again (already expanded) [positive]
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EXPECT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, mixrings));
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// test verify input rings after modify to expansion [positive]
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deserialized_tx.rct_signatures.mixRing.at(0).at(0) = {rct::pkGen(), rct::pkGen()};
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EXPECT_TRUE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, mixrings));
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// test verify input rings after modify to dereferenced mixring [negative]
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rct::ctkeyM modified_mixrings = mixrings;
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modified_mixrings.at(0).at(0) = {rct::pkGen(), rct::pkGen()};
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EXPECT_FALSE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, modified_mixrings));
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modified_mixrings = mixrings;
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modified_mixrings.at(0).at(1) = {rct::pkGen(), rct::pkGen()};
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EXPECT_FALSE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, modified_mixrings));
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// test verify input rings after add dereferenced mixring [negative]
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modified_mixrings = mixrings;
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modified_mixrings.emplace_back();
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EXPECT_FALSE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, modified_mixrings));
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// test verify input rings after remove dereferenced mixring [negative]
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modified_mixrings = mixrings;
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modified_mixrings.pop_back();
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EXPECT_FALSE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, modified_mixrings));
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// test verify input rings after add dereferenced decoy [negative]
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modified_mixrings = mixrings;
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modified_mixrings.at(0).push_back({rct::pkGen(), rct::pkGen()});
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EXPECT_FALSE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, modified_mixrings));
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// test verify input rings after remove dereferenced decoy [negative]
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{
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modified_mixrings = mixrings;
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rct::ctkeyV &mixring0 = modified_mixrings.at(0);
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mixring0.erase(mixring0.begin());
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EXPECT_FALSE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, modified_mixrings));
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}
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{
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modified_mixrings = mixrings;
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rct::ctkeyV &mixring0 = modified_mixrings.at(0);
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mixring0.erase(mixring0.begin() + 1);
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EXPECT_FALSE(cryptonote::ver_input_proofs_rings(deserialized_tx, modified_mixrings));
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}
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}
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